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One of the most vexed topics in Hume scholarship is his position 
regarding personal identity. In this paper, I will demonstrate that Hume 
presents a positive and constructive view of the self in his discussion of the 
indirect passions found in Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) . 1 
For Hume the personal indirect passions of pride and humility are 
constitutive of, or are equivalent to, the impression of the self. Pride and 
humility form a continuum of affective states along which conscious 
apperception moves. Each conscious moment involves the feeling of 
some degree of pride or humility, and this feeling always has reference to 
some conception of self. And in a similar fashion, the external indirect 
passions, love and hatred, are constitutive of, o r equivalent to, our 
knowledge of other minds. These four types of passions are generic, and 
are involved in most of our higher-order affective states and purposeful 
behavior. They are directed by an "original" capacity o f the mind to the 
two major areas of concern we experience during most of our waking 
hours. Pride and humility are involved with our constant desire for our 
own personal well- being and the improvement of our own particular 
situation. Love and hatred are involved with our daily interaction with 
other human beings and society at large. 
Furthermore, these indirect passions are not mere perturbations of 
the soul; instead, they result from the interaction of the two components of 
human consciousness which Hume distinguishes as impressions and 
ideas. I will follow D.G.C. MacNabb's 2 view that the distinction between 
impressions and ideas is that between the given and what is thought about. 
As Hume expresses it, it is the "the difference betwixt feeling and 
thinking." (T. p.2 / cf. Abstract appended to Treatise p.647) This 
] l n this paper, the primary sources are indicated by the following 
abbreviations: (T.) David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature L.A. Selby-
Bigge cd. 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch. (Oxford: At The Claredon 
Press, 1980). I have included with block quotes from the Treatise the book, 
part, and section number to aid in identification. // ( IE. ) David Hume, 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding L.A. Sclby-Bigge ed. 3rd. ed . 
revised by P.H. Nidditch. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1982). // ( D P . ) David 
Hume, "A Dissertation on the Passions" in Essays: Moral, Political, and 
Literary. 2 vols. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose eds. (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1882. vol 2; reprint ed., n.p. Scientia Vcrlag Aalcn, 4 vols., 
1964). 
2 D . G . C . MacNabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality 
(London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951), pp. 25- 32. 
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interpretation avoids the difficulties involved in viewing ideas as weaker 
images or copies of prccecding impressions. For Hume most ideas, 
except those involved in visual imagination, are non-eidetic: they exist but 
arc nowhere. (T. p.235) 
The course of British philosophy from Berkeley to Hutcheson 
witnesses the successful obliteration of the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities. Hume follows Hutcheson's view that secondary 
qualities are constitutive of primary qualities. Thus secondary qualities are 
known as impressions and primary qualities are known only as ideas. (T. 
p.366, pp.225-31 // I E #122 pp.154-55). This crucial feature of Hume's 
epistemology is documented by David Fate Norton. 3 Thus for Hume each 
moment of consciousness is a composite of both impressions and idea. 
To put this issue in better perspective, we must note that there are two 
widely different cpistcmological theories that are attributed to Hume. 
These are , on the o n e hand, idealism or an ex t reme form of 
phenomenalism, and on the other, a physiologically based interactionist 
theory. Hume's cpistcmological position, in fact, steers an even course 
between these two widely different theories. Hume's methodological 
position is phenomenalism, and thus he must restrict his investigation of 
human nature to those perceptions which appear before the mind. (T. 
p.84) But based on common sense, Hume adamantly believes in the 
existence of a self-existing external world, which includes physical objects 
and one's own physical body. (T. p.187/cf p.298) Throughout the Treatise we 
find a certain tension between Hume's acceptance of both these theories 
which ultimately results in his famous "lament" (T. p.636) regarding his 
inability to resolve the question of personal identity found in the Appendix 
(1740). 
Some commentators have wrongly attributed to Hume an "atomic 
theory of perception," resulting in confusion about his epistemologica) 
position. This "atomic view" may be distinguished into a weaker and 
stronger version which have a tendency to be confused. T h e weaker 
version states that our concepts or ideas arc cidctic images or reified 
mental particulars. In contrast, the stronger or metaphysical atomism, 
maintains both that physical objects arc made of atomic particles, and that 
the mind is composed of a grouping of individual perceptions. The 
stronger version suggests that perceptions, like physical atoms, may exist 
outside the mind, and even influence or become perceptions in another 
mind. In the most extreme view both these physical and mental atoms are 
viewed as being in essence the same, and as differing only in being related 
to either an object or a mind. I would maintain that in the numerous 
i n s t a n c e s where H u m e c l a i m s that all our percept ions a r e 
"...distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately 
3 D a v i d Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-sense Moralist, Sceptical 
Metaphysician (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 78-82. 
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consider'd, and may exist separately.../' (T.p.252) he is making a logical 
rather than metaphysical claim. That is, they may be considered 
separably by a "distinction of reason" which does not entail their distinct 
existence. (T. p.25) Oddly enough, it seems that both the weak and strong 
versions of the "atomic" view do not require much effort to be recast in 
representational or mechanical terms. 
I must stress that for Hume ideas and/or impressions are not reified 
mental particulars or images which are representatives of some external 
reality. Our conscious apprehension maintains a synthetic unity over time 
which can not be explained in terms of a mechanical, representational, or 
atomistic epistemology. In this regard, I would maintain that Hume's 
theory of mind is more modern than is usually supposed. 
This thesis will provide an adequate solution to what numerous 
commentators, principally Norman Kemp-Smith have declared to be an 
obvious contradiction between Book I and Book II of the Treatise.4 This 
contradiction is based on the fact that in Book I, "Of the Understanding," 
in the section entitled "On Personal Identity," Hume states that there is 
not a specific impression of the self from which we derive the idea of the 
self. In contrast, Hume states in Book II, "Of the Passions," that "the 
idea or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us." 
(T. p.317) This quotation is just one of a number of statements found in 
Book II which seem to be at odds with what is taken to be Hume's official 
position in Book I. Kemp-Smith has focused on this alleged contradiction 
as textual support for his wider thesis that Hume first wrote Book II of the 
Treatise under the influence of Hutcheson's moral teachings and that 
Book I is the unique and distinctively Humean result of his more mature 
reflections. My purpose is to resolve this contradiction by showing that the 
two differing statements in Book I and II are different aspects of Hume's 
comprehensive view of human nature. 
In Book I, in the section "On Personal Identity," Hume distinguishes 
between these two aspects as follows: 
What then gives us so great a proponsion to ascribe an identity to 
these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves posscst of an 
invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our 
lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt 
personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it 
regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. (1,4,vi p.253) 
For the sake of convenience, we may label these two aspects, 
respectively: philosophical and psychological. Hume emphasizes that it is 
"...the first (which) is our present subject" in this section of Book I. The 
•Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: 
Macmilliam and Co. limited., 1941). 
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philosophical aspect involves metaphysical and epistemological questions 
regarding the self and the origin and application of the concepts o f 
'personal identity' and the 'self. 
Hume does not deny that the term 'self is meaningful; instead, he 
claims that it does not denote just one unique impression, but it refers to a 
random grouping of related or similar impressions. Specifically, the point 
at issue is whether we are able to derive only a "fictional idea" or 
conceptualization of the self, or whether this idea refers to, or is based on 
some unique "felt quality" or impression. Accordingly, Hume states that 
upon introspection the self appears to be just a "bundle or collection of 
perceptions." (T. p.252) 
In contrast, the psychological aspect covers our desire for self-
improvement in our daily affairs. In Book II, Hume's purpose is to follow 
up on this distinction and examine the psychological aspect of personal 
identity. Hume does this is in Part 1 of Book II where he indicates that the 
personal indirect passions of pride and humility are related to the "idea of 
self." 
Hume adopts his usage of the terms pride and humility from Hobbes 5 
and M a n d e v i l l e 6 who both emphasize that these passions play, 
respectively, a positive and negative motivational role in human behavior. 
According to Hobbes, pride or glory was the natural emotion for a noble 
and magnanimous man as he triumphed in his endeavors and acquired 
power, and humility was "the passion contrary to glory, proceeding from 
apprehension of our own infirmity..." 7 
Thus it is a mistake to view these indirect passions in their narrow 
everyday usage. This cannot be overly stressed since even Kemp-Smith 
has indicated that the indirect passsions "do not play a distinctive part" 8 in 
Hume's system. But in contrast, I hope to show that Hume in his 
examination of these indirect passions presents a positive portrait of the 
human mind. Thus in Book II, Hume's purpose is to examine these 
higher-order affective states. 
Hume's examination of pride and humility in Part 1, Book II can be 
divided into three topic areas. The first area, which includes sections ii and 
iii, is an empirical examination of these two passions in which Hume 
defines his terminology. In the second area, sections iv to vi, Hume 
presents his theory of the "double relations of impressions and ideas" as 
the governing principle for the operation of these passions. In section vi, 
Hume presents the limitations of this system. In the final area, which 
comprises sections vii to xii, Hume attempts to apply his system to the 
5 D . D . Raphael ed., British Moralists 1650-1800 2 vol. (Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 6-7. 
6 lbid. , pp. 232-236. 
7 lbid., p. 7. 
''Smith, p. 160. 
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various causes which produce these passions. These include: a concern for 
our moral character, our health and physical appearance, our social 
standing and family relations, our property, and reputation. In this paper I 
will summarize my examination of the first two topic areas only. 
In the first topic area, Hume presents an informal definition for pride 
and humility and indicates that these passions have the same object: the 
"...self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we 
have an intimate memory and consciousness." (T. p.277) Because these 
passions are directly contrary, the self is a necessary though not sufficient 
condition for their existence; in addition, they require a separate 
determining "cause." (T. p.278 cf p.287) 
Hume next distinguishes the cause of these passions into two 
component parts, which he will later describe as "suppos'd properties." (T. 
p.285) These arc the "...quality, which operates, and the subject, on which it 
is plac'd." (T. p.279) Hume describes the full operation of the passions 
thus: 
Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the 
beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. 
the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in which 
the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the 
house, consider'd as his property or contrivance. Both these parts are 
essential, nor is the distinction vain and chimerical. (Il,l,ii p279) 
The quality of the cause is its sensible characteristics, the subject is its 
conceptual nature. In our conscious apprehension, both these aspects arc 
united. To retain the spirit of Hume's theory, I will adopt his use of these 
four terms: object, cause, quality, and subject. As this exposition proceeds, 
the application of these terms will become sufficiently clear. 
In the next topic area in Part 1, Book II, which covers sections iv to vi, 
Hume attempts to prove that his theory of "the double relation of 
impressions and ideas" accurately represents the operation of our 
passions. Relations which Hume describes as "an easy transition" 
between ideas are central to his theory of mind. (T. p.220) In keeping with 
his general psychology, these relations operate on the two levels of ideas 
and impressions, or as indicated above, thought and feeling. 
In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human 
nature, which tho' they have a mighty influence on every operation 
both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much 
insisted on by philosophers. The first of these is the association of 
ideas, which I have so often obscrv'd and cxplain'd.... 
The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like 
association of impressions. (Il,1,iv p.283) 
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Hume divides thought, or the conscious apprehension of ideas, into 
two categories: imagination and the understanding. The imagination 
involves both our awareness of ideas which are produced spontaneously in 
response to some present impression and also the formation o f our 
concepts. 
When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by 
which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean 
the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable 
reasoning. When 1 oppose it to neither, 'tis indifferent whether it be 
taken in the larger or more limited sense, or at least the context will 
sufficiently explain the meaning. (I,3,x p.H8-footnote,cf 11,2,vii p 3 7 1 -
-footnote) 
Therefore, the imagination involves the habitual association the mind 
makes between various ideas, and between impressions and ideas. It 
helps extend our knowledge beyond our present impressions through the 
formation of beliefs, concepts, and certain general rules. (T. pp.197-199) 
Thus the imagination serves as the foundation for our reasoning 
processes. 
H u m e in Book I dis t inguishes also between "natura l " and 
"philosophical" relations. Our ideas associate, or move from one to 
another, in our imagination, according to the three natural relations of 
resemblance, contiguity, and causality. In contrast, for Hume, the 
association of ideas by means of philosophical relations are willed, and 
thus are the basis of our reasoning abilities. (T. p.13-15) Among the later, 
I lume lists the relation of identity which can be applied to objects in the 
world and to ourselves. (T. p.189-218) According to Hume the will is 
"...nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when 
we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of 
our mind." (T. p399) 
Furthermore, Hume maintains there is a "... like association of 
impressions |of reflection-i.e. the passions (T. p.7, pp.275- 76)1, operating 
through resemblance, or a similarity of hedonic quality. (T. p.283) Hume 
states that an additional factor governing the flow of our emotional states 
is a similarity in "tendency or direction." (T. p.381-385) 
Although there is this natural inertia in both our ideas and 
impressions, this does not prevent either from displaying radical shifts in 
our awareness. Through the philosophical relations, our imagination and 
our reasoning abilities are given free rein. Our affective states may be 
changed either by our becoming aware of some new situation, or by the 
imposition of some idea. 
But in general there is the tendency for our awareness to be fixed on 
one type of affective state or passion at one time. Hume indicates that 
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when different passions compete for our attention three different 
situations may occur. (1) the differing passions may exist successively (2) 
the stronger passion will prevail (3) a third passion may be produced— 
e.g.hope or fear arise from the alternating joy and grief experienced when 
one considers the cause of the passions to be probable. Hume graphically 
describes these three alternatives thus: 
The influence of the relation of ideas is plainly seen in this whole 
affair. If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the 
passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have 
no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, 
the passions are like an alcali and an acid, which, being mingled, 
destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and consists in 
the contrary views of the same object, the passions are like oil and 
vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and 
incorporate. (Il,3,ix p.443/cf D.P. p.143) 
The flow and interaction of our passions depends upon the ideas 
which we conceive along with the violence of the prevailing passion. In 
particular, the four indirect passions display both the first and second 
alternative described above. Because pride is opposed to humility, and 
love to hatred, in regard to their respective objects, the self or other minds, 
it is required that there is some external cause or relevant idea to produce 
any of these indirect passions. The manner in which we view the quality of 
the cause determines which alternative takes place. If the cause has 
opposing qualities it may be the source of mental conflict. It is impossible 
for a man to be both proud and humble, or to love and hate the same 
person, at the same time. Rather these passions will occur alternatively as 
we reflect upon the positive or negative qualities of the "subject." At some 
point, this mental conflict will be resolved and then the predominate 
passion will prevail. 
As a concluding remark in section iv Hume states: 
In the third place, 'tis observable of these two kinds of association, that 
they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition 
is more easily made when they both concur in the same object. |that 
is, "cause" e.g. the bad qualities of an enemy]. . . Those principles, 
which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those, which 
operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the 
mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with 
so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be rend or'd so 
much more easy and natural. (11,1,iv pp.283-84) 
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Our ideas and impressions unite in one act of consciousness, which 
then becomes more intense in our awareness, and thus facilitates the 
transition to other similar states of emotion. 
In section v, Hume's purpose is to apply these general considerations 
regarding the flow of our emotions to the personal indirect passions, pride 
and humility. He must show how these two types of association combine in 
one conscious act to form these passions. Thus he must show how these 
two types of association operating on two parallel levels contribute to the 
generation of these emotional states. 
The "suppos'd properties" of the cause are the two parts, subject and 
quality, distinguished above. On the level of ideas or thought the "subject" 
which causes the passion is related to its "object." The possessions and 
character of another unrelated person never cause us to experience pride 
or humility, though our own possessions and character do cause such 
feelings. (T. p.285) 
On the level of impressions or feelings the "quality" of the "cause" 
produces either pleasure or pain. Thus "...(Hume) takes it for granted at 
present, without farther proof, that every cause of pride, by its peculiar 
qualities, produces a separate pleasure, or of humili ty a separate 
uneasiness." (T.p.285) Hume describes this quality as "independent" or 
"separate," which means it is capable of producing pleasure or pain when 
considered objectively. These qualities are assumed to be "natural," based 
upon environmental and societal conditions, which are universally 
acknowledged and sought after by all mankind. 
Hume turns next to the two "establish'd properties" of the passions 
themselves, which he stresses are "original" features of a person's 
biological and psychological make-up. These "establish'd properties" are 
that pride and humility always direct our attention to our self; and that 
these passions are in essence pleasant or painful sensations. (T. p.286) 
When Hume compares the "establish'd properties" of the passion with the 
"suppos'd properties" of the cause he states: 
... I immediately find, that taking these suppositions to be just, the true 
system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence. That cause, 
which excites the passion is related to the object, which nature has 
attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause seperately 
produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double 
relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd. The one idea 
is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one impression into 
that, which resembles and corresponds to it: With how much greater 
facility must this transition be made, where these movements 
mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse 
from the relations both of its impressions and ideas? (11,1,v p.286-87) 
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Finally, Hume suggests lhat the operation of these passions may have 
a physiological basis. (T. p.287) 
Having laid out the textual basis for Hume's theory of the double 
relation of impressions and ideas, we must now turn our attention to one 
final issue. Here I will contrast two interpretive schemata for the operation 
of the passions. I wish to call the schema which has achieved currency 
among most commentators 9 the 'traditional' one, and the schema I wish to 
advance 'hedonic'. In my opinion, most of the criticisms that have been 
leveled at Hume's theory of the passions have been based on the 
acceptance of the ' tradit ional ' schema, and as such have been 
misdirected. We must note, though, that these schemata do not do justice 
to the complexity and dynamic nature of our higher-order affective states; 
they are just useful conceptual devices. 
T h e Tradit ional Schema 
1 . "subject" 4 . "object" 
idea idea 
of a conceptual relation of the 
house e.g. ownership self 
x x 
x ===x 
2 . P l e a s u r e 3. P r i de 
9 l n addition to Kemp-Smith the following scholars present a version of the 
traditional schema: 
Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: At the 
University Press, 1966), p. 26. 
Alfred B. Glathe, Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals: A 
Study of Books II and III of the "Treatise." (Berkeley, Ca: University of 
California Press, 1950), pp. 22-39. 
Nicholas Capaldi, David Hume: Newtonian Philosopher (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 132-34. 
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Norman Kemp Smith, in his monumental work, advances a version of 
the 'traditional' schema which he describes as a: 
... four-stage sequence whereby (1) starting from the idea of this 
complex 'subject', into which the idea of the self enters as a 
component, the mind is carried (2) in and through a separate 
'sensation of pleasure or pain' and (3) through the consequent passion 
of pride or humility, (4) back to the idea of the self. The four stages, he 
insists, are distinct and separate-the sensation of pleasure for instance 
is, he maintains, distinct from the passion of pride, just as truly as the 
passion in itself simple, is distinct both from its exciting 'subject' and 
from its 'object*. And it is because he regards these stages as distinct 
that he is committed to the task of explaining why the steps thus follow 
in sequence, and how in so doing they combine to support and 
reinforce one another . 1 0 
There are three distinct features of this description: (1) that the 
component stages of the process are distinct in some experiential sense (2) 
that the stages occur in discrete steps over time, which involves a number 
of questions, including how these stages arc related, both logically-that is, 
in our conception~and in their actual operation. And (3) that the first 
stage involves the "idea of the subject," which is supposed to initiate the 
process. 
From the above textual analysis, it is evident that none of these three 
features can be read into Hume's stated position; thus the 'traditional' 
schema does not adequately represent his views in this regard. In regard 
to (1) and (2) two points need to be made. First, it is perfectly clear that 
according to Hume the exper ience o f an indirect passion is 
indistinguishable from its hedonic quality. (T. p.286) Second, it seems 
difficult to conceive what it means to be able to distinguish an act of 
conception from its surrounding impressional states, except in retrospect 
and on a purely theoretical basis. Hume indicates that even upon the 
closest introspection such conceptual acts or relations will appear entirely 
hidden. 
T i s evident, that the association of ideas operates in so silent and 
imperceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it, and discover 
it more by its effects than by any immediate feeling or perception. It 
produces no emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind, 
but only modifies those ideas, of which the mind was formerly 
possess'd, and which it cou'd recal upon occasion. (Il,1,ix p.305) 
, 0 Smith , pp. 181-82. 
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In regard to (3) for the most part our experience of either of these 
indirect passions is the result of a present impression, rather than the 
result of some remembered idea. We are directly acquainted with the 
cause of our passions. For example, when we observe our own home we 
become aware, not only of its basic sensible qualities but also its aesthetic 
qualities as well. And at the very same time, we conjoin these virtuous 
qualities, with the notion of ownership, to produce the indirect passion 
itself. In our experience the transition from sensible awareness to its 
corresponding emotional state is smooth and indistinguishable. 
Here I wish to present my interpretive schema, which I call 'hedonic', 
since it emphasizes the immediate apprehension of pleasure or pain in 
our sensible awareness, which, as Hume stresses is in essence the same 
feeling as the passion itself. 
T h e Hedonic S c h e m a 
2 . "Subject" 4 . "Object" 
the idea the idea 
of a house of the 
conceptual relation self 
e.g. ownership 
1. "Quality" 3 . Pride: 
Pleasure: a synthesis of Impression of Reflection 
both sensible and aesthetic i.e. the passion 
impressions i.e. the shape as felt 
and color of the house along 
wi th its beauty 
To emphasize that these four stage blend indistinguishably in our 
awareness, I have added two overlapping circles, which delineate the 
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"suppos'd properties" of the cause from the "established properties" of the 
passion. 
Thus the "cause" in our awareness is a composite of both its sensible 
qualities and the concept of the "subject" which it occasions in our 
understanding. Here we should distinguish this psychological act from the 
fact that in most instances, the cause of the passion is some external self-
existing "subject" or a virtuous quality considered in the abstract. In the 
latter case virtuous qualities are aspects of a person's very being, and thus 
can not be projected on some external existence; nevertheless, we still are 
able to distinguish between their felt qualities and their conceptual nature. 
I lere I have adopted Hume's wider definition of virtue, which includes not 
only what are normally considered moral qualities, but also natural 
abilities, talents, social graces, and personal hygiene. (T. pp.606-14) Thus in 
the case of the virtuous qualities a person possesses, we find both some 
visceral feeling conjoined with an abstract concept of the virtue, along with 
some knowledge regarding its justification. The more unique the cause of 
the passion is, the greater is its requirement to be conceptualized, verbally 
or otherwise, and justified to oneself. In our daily affairs, these virtues are 
intensified through a sympathetic appreciation of how others perceive us. 
(T. p.316) These virtuous qualities are aspects of personal character and do 
not exist externally, except in the opinions of others and in virtuous 
actions, which in themselves are effects and secondary. 
I have connected the "suppos'd properties" of the "cause" to the 
"established properties" of the passion by a pair of dashed lines. This 
indicates the parallel action of the two levels of association operating 
between ideas on the one hand, and impressions o a the other. The idea of 
the "cause/subject" is joined conceptually with the idea of the self as the 
one who owns, possesses, or is otherwise related to it. The "cause/quality", 
or capacity for producing pleasure or pain, is in essence the unique feeling 
of the passion. According to Hume, our feelings of pleasure and pain are 
equivalent to the positive or negative evaluation we give our particular 
situation and involves, not only gross sensible feelings, but also our moral 
and aesthetic tastes. (T. p.472) 
Again, it should be emphasized that the pleasure or pain, the "cause" 
produces is not independent or separate, as a distinguishable sensible 
element, but rather constitutes the very essence of the passion itself. 
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any affective state which was perfectly 
indifferent and did not possess some measure of cither pleasure or pain, 
especially when compared to some other point along the scale. 
Finally, I have placed a circle to comprehend both the "established 
properties" and to stress that both are component aspects of a single act of 
conscious apperception. Each moment of consciousness is a simple unity, 
and inherits all the preceding moments. The idea of the self is not some 
distinct, abstract, or metaphysical concept, as some commentators seem 
to believe, but a vital part of the complete emotional state. Thus to 
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distinguish and separate our ideas or concepts from their concurrent 
affective states, as the 'traditional schema' suggest, is to ignore the 
importance of the dynamic interaction between these two levels of mental 
operation. The affective quality or feeling of either pride or humility, 
unites in one conscious act with our conception o f the self and its related 
causes. Thus pride and humility are forms o f self-valuation which 
invariably direct our attention to ourselves and vary according to how we 
conceive of our various virtuous qualities and social situation. The idea of 
the self is constituted out of the causes of pride or humility which are 
conceptual ly linked to it. T o paraphrase H u m e : ". . .were all (our| 
perceptions remov'd..." and we had no awareness of our property, our 
accomplishments, our natural abilities, our physical appearance, our 
virtues, our reputation, our health, our friends and relations, it would be 
hard to "...conceive what is farther requisite to make |us| a perfect non-
entity." (T. p.252) Without such personal connections, our life would be 
empty and devoid of meaning. Thus our idea of self, as experienced in our 
practical daily affairs, is not an innate spiritual entity; it is the result of all 
these connections held together in our understanding, by memory and 
causal inference (T. pp.261-62), and facilitates the ease of transition among 
the natural and philosophical relations. 
Our self, independent of the perception of every other object, is in 
reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external 
objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as 
lie contiguous to us, or resemble us. But when self is the object of a 
passion, 'tis not natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion 
b e exhausted; in which case the double relations of impressions and 
ideas can no longer operate. (II,2,iii pp.340-41) 
I hope that, in what has preceded, I have adequately covered all three 
features that the 'traditional' schema suggests, as indicated above. First, 
the four stages are not perceived separately, but rather are distinguished 
retrospectively by a "distinction of reason." (T. p.25) Second, these four 
stages occur nearly instantaneously and all unite in one complete act. t hir 
impressions and ideas are combined together to form our basic conscious 
awareness. Thus pride and humility arc not only impressions or simple 
perturbations of the soul, but rather involve complex evaluative judgments 
regarding the self. And lastly, the indirect passions are occasioned, for the 
most part, by present states of sensible awareness , rather than by 
remembered ideas. 
Finally, as conclusive textual support for this thesis, it should be noted 
that every time Hume mentions "the double relation of impressions and 
ideas," both aspects arc in the plural. This indicates that the first stage of 
the operation requires certain imprcssional qualities, along with some 
idea. These imprcssional qualities involve the indefinable moral and 
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aesthetic judgments that constantly attend our sensible awareness of the 
environment. Hume, in concluding section v, makes this explicitly clear. 
He states that the first stage of the operation is similar to his explanation 
of belief, "...which we form from causation..." (T. p.289 cf p.78), that he 
believes he has proved in Book 1. Hume defines belief as ".... A LIVELY 
IDEA R E L A T E D T O O R A S S O C I A T E D W I T H A P R E S E N T 
IMPRESSION." (T. p.96) Therefore, we are able to apply certain 
conceptual judgments in regard to our overall sensible awareness. For 
example, from the plethora of sensible and aesthetic qualities, we are 
immediately able to distinguish and judge that their cause is a beautiful 
house, which we further believe to be a self-existing entity and over which 
its owner wields some causal authority. 
Therefore, for Hume, the continuum of affective states ranging from 
pride to humility are constitutive of, or equivalent to the impression of self. 
This thesis provides a number of useful insights regarding Hume's overall 
philosophical enterprise in the Treatise and, most important, helps to put 
Hume's statements in Book I regarding personal identity in proper 
perspective. His purpose is to attack the belief that we are acquainted 
through introspection with some unique and indefeasible impression, or 
sensible awareness of the self. Hume asserts, instead, with his famous 
"bundle metaphor" that we are acquainted with a variety of random and 
disparate perceptions which together constitute conscious apprehension. 
Most commentators focus their attention on the negative and critical 
tone of this "bundle metaphor" and thus overlook the positive and 
constructive aspects of Hume's psychology. They assume that Hume, in 
presenting this "bundle metaphor," is recommending some version of the 
'atomic theory of perception' as indicated above. But the result is, in 
essence, an incomprehensible interpretation of his theory of mind. 
Therefore, these c o m m e n t a t o r s 1 1 direct their attacks against this 
radical interpretation of Hume's psychology to make their work easier. In 
particular, they question Hume's belief that the natural relations of 
"resemblance and causation" provide the unity which we experience in our 
1 ' T h e following scholars have attributed some version of the "atomic 
theory of perception" to Hume: 
Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Rout ledge & Kcgan Paul, 1977), pp. 124-
26. 
Cavendish, A.P. (Basson, A.H. psued. 1958), David Hume (New York: 
Dover Publications, inc., 1968), pp.132-33. 
Aycr A.J., Hume Past Master's Scries (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), 
pp52-54. 
Stroud and Cavendish argue, respectively, that the relations of 
resemblance and causation are insufficient to provide the unity which we 
feel in our conscious apperception. Ayer presents a similar view. 
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consciousnesss. (T. p.260) These commentators conclude that, because 
Hume subscribes to the 'atomic theory' , he requires some further 
principle beyond just resemblance and causation to unite these separate 
free-floating atomic perceptions into one complete act of consciousness. 
They assert that this 'principle of individuation' is either some spiritual 
substance, or results from some physiological process. However, I believe, 
Hume would be sceptical of both these forms of explanation, since both go 
beyond the phenomena of our perception. Although both these forms of 
explanation are plausible, they are at best hypotheses which rely upon 
metaphysical and hence unknowable principles. 
I would, instead, assert the more modest claim, that this 'principal of 
individuation' is the result of our intelligent and purposeful interaction 
with the world found in our higher-order affective states. T h i s 
psychological necessity is a basic fact of our existence which is impossible 
to further dissect and analyze. This conclusion is consistent with the 
phenomenalistic portrait of the human mind which Hume presents in 
Book II. Thus it is a mistaken belief that the mind requires some 
additional 'principle of individuation' beyond that which is experienced 
daily in our practical goal-oriented behavior. 
T h e "bundle metaphor" makes a logical and epistemological claim 
rather than a metaphysical and ontological one. Hume's purpose is to 
show that personal identity is not derived from a single, unique, and 
invariable impression. It is, in fact, an abstraction based on our 
acquaintance with all of our perceptions. Hume indicates that identity is a 
philosophical relation which in essence is the arbitrary association of ideas 
by our reasoning capacities. The identity which we attribute to the mind is 
a "fictitious one" derived through our faculties of memory, imagination, 
and reason. (T. p.259) 
Later in Book'I, in the section "On Personal Identity," Hume indicates 
that his preferred metaphor for the identity of our conscious apprehension 
is a nation-state. 
Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these 
ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chaccs 
another, and draws after it a third, by which it is cxpcU'd in its turn. In 
this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing 
than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members 
are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, 
and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the 
incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic 
may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; 
in like manner the same person may vary his character and 
disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his 
identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts arc still 
connected by their relation of causation. And in this view our identity 
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with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to 
the imagination, by making our distant perceptions influence each 
other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains 
and pleasures. (1,4,vi p.261) 
This analogy with a political entity is a much more sophisticated 
portrait of the mind than that provided by the "bundle metaphor." Thus 
our notion of the self results from the mind's ability to conceive and apply 
abstract ideas, or interpretive concepts, to the unity we feel is ever-present 
in our conscious awareness. Hume's view of personal identity, in this 
section, in no way denies or contradicts the belief that we are intimately 
acquainted with the unity of our conscious life. His purpose, instead, is to 
deny that this idea of the self is based upon some introspective awareness 
of a unique and unchanging impression. 
Out Hume himself in the Appendix to the Treatise, expresses his 
disillusionment over this whole question regarding personal identity. On 
the one. hand, he realizes that the conscious unity found in our higher-
order affective states requires a "real connexion" (T. p.636), or 'principal of 
individuation', among our various perceptions. On the other hand, he is 
unwilling to abandon his phenomenalistic methodology which prevents 
him from speculation as to its nature. He realizes that such a "real 
connexion" is beyond the phenomena of our conscious perception and 
thus is unknowable. The result, therefore, is his famous "lament." 
Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity arises 
from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected 
thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a 
promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the 
principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or 
consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me 
satisfaction on this head. 
In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent, nor 
is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct 
perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives 
any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions 
either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind 
perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no 
difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a 
sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my 
understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely 
insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature 
reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those 
contradictions. (T. Appendix pp.635-36) 
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Few philosophers are willing to admit publically to their mistakes and 
inabilities, and thus we must conclude that "Hume's lament" is indicative 
of rare intellectual honesty on his part. If we are to advance in our 
philosophical inquiries we must adopt a similar honesty and fairness in our 
criticism of past thinkers. Therefore, to interpret Hume correctly, and to 
recognize where he makes his mistakes, we must learn to appreciate both 
the negative and positive aspects of his theory of personal identity. It is 
only then that we will be able to make some progress in our own 
philosophy. 
